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THE DENIAL OF BENEFITS QUANDARY
AND MANAGED CARE:
MCGRAW v. PRUDENTIAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
JenniferAl. Jendusa"

INTRODUCTION
"Getting really sick is what worries most Americans. They lnow
how hard it can be to cut through the nanaged-carered tapefor
apairof eyeglasses ora simple ear infection. Mat would happen,
they wonder, ifthey or one of their loved ones became desperately
ill andneededserious- and expensive - medical attention? Who
wouldprevailiftheirmedicalneeds ran smack intogatekeepers of
an HMOfocusedprimarilyon reducing costs?"'

Health insurance may not be mandatory in the United States, but given the
high cost of health care it does appear to be a necessity. People need to be
prepared in the event that they need costly, life-saving medical attention.
Furthermore, health insurance has become an increasing necessity due to
the high costs of health care treatments. While a variety of insurance
plans are available, the forms most prevalent today are cost-containing
managed-care entities, or Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and

"Staff Writer, DEPAULJOURNALOFHEALTHCARELAW. B.A., Marquette University, 1997;
J.D. (Cand.), DePaul University College of Law, 2000.
'Christine Gorman, Playingthe HMO Game: Denicd Jiagra and fnflamcd by Hlorror
Stories, ConsumersPut HealthReform Back on the FrontBurner,TIME, July 13, 1993, at 12 24,
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Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs). 2 Cost-containing efforts of
HMOs and PPOs have come under increased scrutiny for denying
coverage to claims that would provide necessary treatment to an ailing
patient. This situation begs the question whether insurance companies,
designed to provide individuals with the resources necessary in case of
emergencies, can refuse to pay for the treatment required. Although such
a scenario appears counterintuitive, the fact is that managed-care insurance
entities have increasingly faced scrutiny for denying benefits. The
following examples consider whether assessments that determine the
prescribed treatment is not medically necessary in a given case are
actually an economic decision to contain costs.
Thirteen year-old Matthew Cerniglia developed a rare and aggressive
form of cancer, and doctors estimated that he had a 20% chance of
survival.3 Matthew was administered a course of chemotherapy, which
was initially paid for by the Cerniglia's HMO.4 When the chemotherapy
was deemed unhelpful in Matthew's situation and a bone-marrow
transplant was recommended, the insurance company refused to cover the
procedure.5 According to the HMO, the new bone-marrow transplant
treatment was not on the list of approved therapies that would receive
coverage, nor was the procedure "medically necessary.",6 Consequently,
Matthew's family was left with the arduous task of trying to accumulate
$100,000 to pay the bills already incurred, as well as the large sum that the
transplant would require.7
Mary Halm of Ohio suffered from an extreme case of endometriosis
which caused her excruciating pain much of the time.8 Her HMO paid for
several operations, but the procedures failed to remove all of the uterine
tissue causing her pain.9 After learning about a specialist in Atlanta, Mary
attempted to procure coverage to seek the additional expertise of this new

2

See Vemellia R. Randall, Managed Care, UtilizationReview, andFinancialRisk Shiting:

CompensatingPatientsfor Health Care Cost ContainmentInjuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. RLV,

1,20 (1994).

3See Gorman, supra note 1, at 24.
See id.
'See id.
6See id. In the insurance industry, medical necessity refers to treatments and procedures an
insurance company deems necessary and appropriate as the sole or most effective means of
improving an individuals health. See id.
7See id.
8See Gorman, supra note 1, at 25.
9See id.
4
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physician.' ° The HMO refused to cover the specialist in Atlanta, claiming
that plenty of qualified specialists resided in her area (although the
insurance company could not name any)." After appealing the denial of
benefits for nine months,
Mary borrowed the necessary money, and
12
underwent the operation.
These stories are a small sampling of anecdotal evidence describing
how patients have been left to suffer pain, or even face imminent death,
because of the decisions of insurance companies to deny payments of
medical benefits. Not always receiving a clear explanation for the denial,
consumers are becoming increasingly frustrated at what appears in many
cases to be cost-containment decisions that supersede a patient's wellbeing. 3 Must consumers live in fear that managed care entities will
primarily focus on financial considerations and not examine what is truly
in the best interest of the patient?
This article will examine the history of health care and the evolution
of the managed care system in the insurance industry. t4 It will evaluate
the managed care system in light of the process of utilization review and
recent case law in this area.'
A recent case McGraw v. Prudential
Insurance Company of America, 16 which involves denial of benefits on
the basis that the prescribed treatment was not medically necessary under
the definitions of the insurance plan 7 will be examined. Attempts to
assure quality care in the medical setting 8 will be analyzed, as well as the
ramifications of the court's holding on the future of health care and
utilization review.1 9

"°Seeid.
"See
id.
12See id.

"See Randall, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("But managed care, like other programs m the past, has
become so focused on the problem of cost that it may very well be losing sight of,%hat should bthe overriding purpose of health care - the well being of the patient.... The patient's v.cli-bein
is not directly aided by cost-containment .... ).
"See infra pp. 118-128 and accompanying text.
5
See infra pp. 121-128 and accompanying text.
6
McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998.
"See infrapp. 128-137 and accompanying text.
"See infra pp. 137-139 and accompanying text.
"See infra pp. 137-139 and accompanying text.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:115

BACKGROUND
The History of the Health Care System and the
Evolution of Managed Care
America's health care system has undergone vast changes over the last
100 years, with each change resulting in both positive and negative
ramifications to the individuals and health care entities involved.20 In
general, the historical changes can be classified as movement from a
home-based system to a hospital-based enterprise, transition from a
nursing care-based system to a technology-based system, and modification
from a patient interest driven enterprise to a provider interest driven
enterprise. 21 Presently, change in the health care arena is not unusual.
Specifically, the health care industry has faced a significant and ongoing
transformation resulting from the evolution from a provider-driven system
to a third-party payer-driven system.22
Early medicine (dating as far back as the 1600s if not earlier) was
quite rudimentary, as limited technological resources, treatment
alternatives, and medications restricted physicians' options.23 Physicians
offered ill patients little more than house calls, observation and simple
surgical procedures.24 This was due partly to the lack of financial
resources available to the individual patients to compensate physicians, as
well as a lack of professional resources available to the treating doctors.25
Additionally, lack of treatment facilities thwarted the ability to offer
necessary and quality patient care. 26 From the 1700s to mid-1800s, only
the poorest and lowest class individuals went to the hospital, which was

"See Randall, supra note 2, at 9.

"See id. The negative features resulting from the changes in health care possibly could
have been avoided if attention was paid to "the down side of changes occurring in the health care
system." Id.

'See id. at 10. "As the new system is being designed and implemented, it is important to
understand how the current systemic problems developed. Only then can actions be taken to avoid

analogous pitfalls in this new third-party payer-driven system." Id.
"See Allison Faber Walsh, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment Afechanisins: The
ExpansionofLiabilityforPhysiciansandManagedCare Organizations,31 J.MARSHALL L. REV.
207,211 (1997).

24Seeid. Reimbursement methods formedical assistance were also quite rudimentary. After

providing the necessary treatment to the patient, the physician set a fee that the patient was capable
of paying out-of-pocket. "This simple reimbursement method was, and still is, referred to as feefor-service." Id.

"See id.
26See id.
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an unsophisticated and small section of ajail or almshouse.2 7 Those who
could pay the expense of personal treatment instead opted to stay in the
comfort of their home for treatment. 28 The first community-owned
hospitals serving both the poor and paying patients were created in the late
1700s at the urging of European-trained doctors, although hospital stays
n
and treatment plans did not become widely accepted until the late 1800s.
In the early 1900s, with the availability, acceptance, and familiarity
of hospital care increasing, patients chose to seek treatment at hospitals
rather than receive treatment at home.30 This all began to change with the
onset of the Great Depression.3 ' As a result of the economic disparity felt
by American society during the Depression, patients were unable to pay
for basic health care, let alone complex and expensive hospital bills."'
Consequently, the economic stability of hospitals and medical institutions
wavered greatly from the lack of patient use. 33 Hit hard by this economic
downfall, the American Hospital Association and insurance companies
created private health insurance options to assure stable revenues and
provide affordable health care to citizens struggling financially.
The Blue Cross insurance plans created during the Depression only
guaranteed payment of hospital costs in an "environment of limited
technology and patient self-rationing." 35 However, given the economic
status of the country, response was enormous. 3' The limited coverage of
the Blue Cross plans was applauded by physicians in the American
Medical Association (AMA) who believed that insurance should be paid

"See Randall, supra note 2, at 10.
'See id.
'See id. at 10-11. "As late as 1873, there were only 178 hospitals with a total of 35,064

beds in the entire United States. Only thirty-six years later, in 1909, the number hAl grown to
4,359 hospitals with 421,065 beds, and by 1929 to 6,665 hospitals with 907,133 bc 13"Sce Id
at 11.
"See Walsh, supra note 23, at 212.
"See Randall, supra note 2, at 11.
"See id.
""As early as 1930, average hospital receipts fell from S236.12 per patient in the 1920; to
S59.26, bed occupancy dropped from 71.28% to 64.12%, and hospital deficits roze dramatically"
See id. at 11. See also Walsh, supra note 23, at 212.
'4See Randall, supra note 2, at 11; Walsh, supra note 23, at 212.
"Randall, supranote 2, at 11. Given the overall poor economic status ofAmencan z~iety,
the extreme popularity of the plans was predictable. "The plans, however, covered only hozpital
costs. Physicians, through the American Medical Association (AMA), sought to keep coverage
limited." Id.
"See id.
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only to the patients. 37 Physicians feared that third-party intermediaries
would play too significant a role in determining medical treatment,
perhaps at the expense of patient well-being. 38 The AMA specifically
feared that third-party payers dealing directly with physicians would
eventually require that medical decisions be made on the basis of the
third-parties' interest and not that of the patient.39 Such fears and
reservations were not seriously considered at the time, although history
would prove the observations to be highly insightful. Despite the
warnings, some states adopted the popular Blue Shield medical service
benefits.4n
After World War II, commercial insurance emerged as wage and
price freezes and tax exemptions prompted employers to offer health
insurance programs to workers.4 ' With the coming of commercial
insurance opportunities came tremendous growth in the health insurance
industry and the integration of health insurance into employee benefits
programs.42 As the health care industry grew, modernized, and
transformed into an institution in its own right, demand for services
increased along with demand for coverage. 43 To supply the needed
insurance benefits, new insurance companies sprang up in competition
with the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, and the field became
increasingly competitive. 44 The result of the increased number of
individuals covered by insurance was a disparity between those who had
private insurance and those who did not.45
The method of reimbursement of health insurance companies was
fee-for-service.4 6 This entailed physicians providing patient treatment and
diagnoses exclusively, with total discretion to utilize whatever resources
3

7See id.

38
See
39

id.
See id. "The current interest in managed care plans, which emphasize controlling
physicians' behavior, indicates that physicians' historical fears of third-party payer control of
medical40practice decision making were well founded." Id. at 12.
See id. at 11-12. "Like Blue Cross, Blue Shield proved extremely popular. Over the last
sixty years, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans have become the largest providers of private
medical41 insurance." Id. at 12.
See Randall, supra note 2, at 12; Walsh, supra note 23, at 212.
42
See Randall, supra note 2, at 12; Walsh, supra note 23, at 212
43
See Randall, supra note 2, at 12.
44
See id. Unlike the early Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, the new commercial policies
offered45an indemnity benefit. Id.
See id. at 13.
46
See Walsh, supra note 23, at 213.
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were necessary to handle a situation, regardless of cost. 47 Physicians
tendered bills to patients, and the insurance company covered the
expenses.4
Consequently, due to the willingness of the insurance
company to pay whatever costs incurred, neither the physician nor the
patient were motivated to utilize any cost controlling measures." This
resulted in high profits to physicians, but extended heavy burdens on the
insurance companies required to fulfill payment schedules.: In essence,
the fee-for-service model encouraged physicians to over-utilize treatment
and accumulate expenses at alarmingly rapid rates, which yielded
significantly more money ultimately landing in the physicians' pockets.5,
With the increasing costs placed upon insurance companies, cost
containment measures became necessary for institutional survival.5 2
Therefore, "escalating health care costs and innovative medical
technology forced insurers, policymakers and employers to consider a new
method for the delivery of health care." 53 To this end, Congress passed
the Health Maintenance Act in 1973, marking the official recognition of
managed care as a new system of affordable quality health care to those
enrolled. 4
The Managed Care System and Utilization Review
When the Health Maintenance Act was passed in 1973, managed care was
thrust into the mainstream insurance industry. 55 Despite its popularity and
overall dominance currently,56 the concept of managed care was not
47
See id. "Physicians exerted exclusive control over the diagnosis and treatment ofpatients
and had4 complete discretion to choose the method and cost of treatment." Id
SUnlike the current managed care system, these bills submit by physicians were beyond
review,49and payment was made immediately without question, See id
See id.
50
See id.
"1See Walsh, supra note 23, at 213.
'523See Id.

Id.

'See id. at 213-15. The purpose of the Federal HMO Act is to provide financial assistance
to HMOs that meet the established criteria. This financial aid comes in the form of loans and
grants allocated to individuals interested in creating HMOs that meet the guidelines, See td at
n.32. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 can be found at 42 U-SC §§ 3qua300e-17 (1994) (amended 1976, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988).
5
See id. at 214-15.
5
'Over sixty million people, about 24% of American workers and dependents, are eli2tble
for an HMO or other form of managed care entity. Frank J. Rief, Il, The Eioluzaon of,fanagcd
Care, C653 ALI-ABA 1, 3 (1991). Today, 85% of insured employees have mo,.cd from
traditional fee-for-service plans into managed care plans, including HMOs. Gorman, supra note
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entirely new.57 Previously, prepared managed care plans were utilized in
various contexts: by nineteenth century slave owners for their slaves'
medical treatment; by powerless workers concerned with adequate health
coverage; and by large industries dealing with increasing numbers of work
related injuries.5 8 Managed care was also instituted in the late 1920s and
early 1930s when employers began to offer prepaid health care to
employees.5 9 Regardless ofthe year, managed care enterprises shared one
60
thing, a commitment to cost containment measures.
Managed care systems work towards cost containment in medical
situations through a number of systematic practices involving various
structures, including HMOs and PPOs. 61 "An [sic] HMO is an organized
system of health care delivery for both hospital and physician services in
which care delivery and financing functions are offered by one
organization." 62 Since the HMO provider list is limited, patients have
little or no flexibility in determining from which providers to seek medical
treatment. 63 HMO service is provided for both a fixed and a prepaid fee,
and the financial risk is shifted from the third-party payer to the service
provider. 64 "PPOs contract directly with an employer through the
employer's health benefits department or indirectly through an insurance
carrier to provide health care services from a pre-selected group of
providers." 65 Because ofthe limited list of qualified providers, the overall

1, at23.
The truth is, Americans are probably as healthy today as they ever were, and
are paying less for their health coverage. Thanks at least in part to managed
care, vaccination rates are up, premature births are down, more women are

getting mammograms than ever before and costs have fallen dramatically.
Managed care saved between $150 billion and $250 billion last year alone out
of total U.S. health-care spending of S I trillion.
See id. at 24.
57
See Walsh, supra note 23, at 210.
58
See id. at 210-11.
59
See id. at 212.
60
See id. at 215.
"See Randall, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6"Randall,
supra note 2, at 20.
63See id. at 19, 23.

'See id. at 20. "This shift means that HMOs can obtain cost savings only by controlling
both utilization and expenses. They do so by encouraging fewer hospital admissions, more
outpatient
procedures, and fewer referrals to specialists." See id.
6
See id. at 22-23.
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expense to patients within a PPO is lower than with traditional insurance
measures, and participants have the ability to choose from a list of
physicians. 6
Managed health care is provided to subscribers on a contractual basis
between the health care contractor and the managed care organization. 7
Several methods are utilized to monitor the care rendered:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

peer review and utilization review;
quality control and monitoring of patient data;
cost control management;
high practice standards by physicians; and
efficient administration of the facility as a business.3

Although all ofthese measures are significant in managed care, utilization
review is quite possibly the most well-kmown and most controversial.
Utilization Review
Utilization review, as implemented by managed care organizations, is a
means of lowering health costs by decreasing unnecessary medical
procedures, hospital stays, and patient tests 9 In other words, utilization
review assures that payment is only made in cases where the services are
medically necessary and appropriate given the patient's needs and the plan
policy.70 Each subscribing patient's records are reviewed in a two-step
process by a practitioner on a case-by-case basis in order to prevent
unnecessary and overly costly medical procedures. 7 Typically, a nonphysician reviewer, such as a nurse or another provider, applies a

6
See id. "Physicians entering into provider contracts with PPOs agree to accept bhth
utilization review controls and financial risk shifting structures. Third-party payers giv e
consumers economic incentives to use the PPO physicians through reduced fees for serv ices," Id
'lSee Randell, supra note 2, at 19-20.
SRief, supra note 56, at 3.
69
See Walsh, supra note 23, at 216. See also Randall, supra note 2, at 26-29. Utilization
review is the process by which a health care entity determines ifmedical services are "appropriate
and necessary. Managed care products perform [Utilization Review] by examining prov ders'
authorization and furnishing of services to detect variations from the norm that may indicate
unnecessary or inappropriate care. When the third-party payer detects variation, it either does not
pay theprovider's charges (retrospective [utilization review]) or refuses to authorize the proviasion
of the service (concurrent [utilization review]) and prospective [utilization review])" Id.
7
See Michael A. Dowell, Avoiding HMO Liabilityfor UtiliationRcric-,: 23 U, TOL. L.
REV. 117,
117 (1991).
7
'See Walsh, supra note 23, at 216-17; Dowell, supra note 70, at 118.
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predetermined set of criteria to the case presented.72 If the treatment
suggested does not satisfy the criteria, the matter is referred to a utilization
review physician consultant.73 The physician consultant and attending
doctor then discuss the case, and the medical necessity of the treatment is
determined. 74 Non-authorization results in non-payment of claims, while
authorization, sometimes with restrictions, means that reimbursement will
occur. 75 Three types of utilization review exist: prospective, concurrent
and retrospective.76
Prospective utilization review occurs before treatment is ever
77
rendered, and as such, the process is similar to an approval of services.
This program requires the service provider to obtain pre-authorization
before treatment is rendered. 78 This is especially applicable in cases of
hospitalization, expensive testing, and situations involving non-contract
physicians. 79 The claim reviewer determines whether the treatment sought
is medically necessary.80 If the treatment is deemed medically necessary,
then a treatment schedule is approved and the procedure can be
performed.8 ' However, ifthe treatment is viewed not medically necessary,
the reviewer will submit a refusal for reimbursement of the treatment
costs. 82 Concurrent review occurs throughout the course of treatment to
determine whether a treatment prescribed is necessary at the time and
specifies the number of visits or procedures for which payment will be
authorized. 83 Retrospective utilization review, as the name implies, occurs
after treatment is completed. 84 If a reviewer determines that a completed
service was unnecessary,
the managed care entity will refuse to cover the
85
treatment.
of
costs

7

See Dowell, supra note 70, at 118.

73

See id.
See id.

74

756See Walsh, supra note 23, at 217; Dowell, supra note 70, at 118.
7 See Walsh, supra note 23, at 217.
77
See id.
78
See Dowell, supra note 70, at 118.
79

See id.

"0See Walsh, supra note 23, at 217.
81
See id. at 216.
82
See id. at 216-17.
"See id. at 217; Dowell, supra note 70, at 118.
84
85See Dowell, supra note 70, at 117; Walsh, supra note 23, at 217.
See Walsh, supra note 23, at 217.
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Utilization review in the managed care setting has not gone

unnoticed.86 Since patient treatment, and sometimes well-being, is
determined by the decision whether or not to authorize a prescribed

treatment, utilization review decisions are often the topic of debate.57 In
some instances, authorization decisions have fueled such emotional debate
that the legal system intervened in the managed care hierarchy. 3
In Sarchett v. Blue Shield,8 9 the California Supreme Court affirmed
an insurer's fundamental right to disagree with the treating physician's

determination of medical necessity. 90 However, the court held that if
coverage is denied, the insurer must inform the insured of contractual
rights to an independent review of the case.91 The Sarchett court
acknowledged the "increasing practice ofhealth care payers to require preauthorization for elective procedures. 9"

Another important decision from California regarding utilization
review is Wickline v. State.93 In Wickline, a Medicaid patient underwent
coronary artery bypass surgery for Leriche's Syndrome.94 Although only
"This is particularly because of that which is at stake in the utilization rev iew prozen.
A utilization reviewer has a strong interest in minimizing the amount oftreatment
to patients which can create a conflict for a physician who determines that a
treatment is medically necessary for his patient. Although the MCO may deny
treatment, the physician is responsible for the treatment and care of the patient.
Therefore, the question becomes, who is responsible %,hena physician stops
treating a patient because the MCO denies coverage for the treatment and the
patient is injured as a result.
Id. at 224. This is the very question that has recently led to a number of court cases to decide
who is responsible
for the patient after a denial of benefits from utilization review occurs.
87See id.
SSee id. at 224-39.
SSarchett v. Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987).
9'See id. at 273.
91

See id. at 276-77.

92

See id. at 275; Linda V. Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost Containmcnt
Measures, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 79, 82 (1990). However, fearing that payers may become
overly aggressive in coverage decisions, "the decision included a reminder that any doubts and
uncertainties in an insurance policy will be construed in favor of coverage for the insured. As a
result, the court predicted that the decision of a treating physician will rarely be rever:cd as being
unreasonable or contrary to good medical practice." Id.
"Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
'See id. at 1634. See Dowell, supra note 70, at 119-20. The procedure and ten days of
post-surgical hospitalization were authorized, and due to complications, an eight day extension
was sought by the physician to continue hospitalization. The Medicaid reprezentative only
authorized four additional days, and the patient was discharged at the end of this period. Id
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an intermediate court ruling, the court discussed utilization review and
held that negligent utilization review decisions may result in a denial of
necessary treatment, but that it is the physician who is responsible to
determine medical necessity." As such, the third-party reviewer could be
held liable for "defects in the design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms" resulting in the 9denial
of necessary medical
6
procedures, but not the underlying decision.
Managed care entities relied extensively on the Wickline decision to
protect themselves from liability for appropriate utilization review
decisions that resulted in patient injury.9 7 However, the MCOs were
reluctant to use the decision as a rationale to deny treatment after the
California Court ofAppeals denied summary judgment motions "brought
by private insurance companies and a utilization review entity being sued
for negligent utilization review."9 Then a new case came into the courts
that opened the door for injured plaintiffs to sue their MCOs if a denial of
benefits played a significant role in a patient's injury.9 9
In Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California,'00 the Court of
Appeals distinguished the Wickline case, where the decision to deny
benefits met the medical standard for care as defined in the California
Administrative Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code, from the case
at hand where the decision to discharge the patient by his insurance
company raised a question of fact for the jury to decide. 101 Wickline was
also distinguished on the basis that the payment of benefits was pursuant
to the provisions of a code, not a contract.0 2 The Wilson Court, applying
9

SSee Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1643-47.

96

See Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645; Dowell, supra note 70, at 121; Tiano, supranote
92, at 84.
97
See Walsh, supra note 23, at 228.
98

See id.

99

See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
'"Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).

Howard Wilson was admitted to the hospital for drug dependency, anorexia and depression. His
treating physician determined that it was medically necessary for Howard to remain in the hospital
for a few hours for observation and treatment. The utilization review process determined that
Howard did not meet the criteria necessary for a hospital admission and denied any benefits after
Howard's eleventh day in the hospital. Howard was therefore released, and twenty days later
killed himself. Id. at 877-78.
' 'Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 885; Walsh, supra note 23, at 229.
'0 2See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Actually, Wickline was distinguished from Wilson
when the court stated the following:
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tort liability principles, stated that any defendant whose negligent conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about a patient's injuries can be held
liable.103 Also, the court rejected the defendants' argument that a treating

physician has a responsibility to challenge utilization review decisions,
and failure to do so renders the treating physician responsible for the
discharge and in resulting injury.1 4 Essentially, "the Wilson court opened
the door for injured plaintiffs to sue their MCOs if denial of benefits is a
substantial factor in the patient's injury and reversed the rule that
physicians are solely responsible for all discharge decisions." '
These cases are certainly not the only ones challenging the process
of utilization review.1 6 A recent case, McGraw v. PrudentialInsurance
Company ofAmerica,'0 7 addresses several issues: Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preemption, utilization review,
denial of benefits, and the responsibility of managedt care
entities for the
3
decisions made in terms of the patient's well-being

(1) The Wickline decision to discharge met the statutory standard of care for
physicians treating Medicaid patients. No statutory standard of care vas at issue
in Wilson. (2) The Wickline utilization review activities were not undertaken
pursuant to a contract, as they were in Wilson, but were guided by state statutes
and regulations. (3) The statutory standard of care in Wicklme established a
public policy exception to usual standards for tort liability regarding utilization
review decisions for Medicaid services. The Wilson court concluded that no
expressed public policy considerations existed to alter the normal rule of tort
liability for utilization review activities undertaken pursuant to a private contract.
(4)Wickline did not involve a cost-containment procedure limitation that
'permitted... corrupt medical judgment .. .,' as the court implied was the case
in Wilson.
Dowell, supra note 70, at 124.
'03Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883. "The elements of joint tort liability are. The actor's
negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another [because] (a)his conduct is a subtantial
factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability
because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm." Walsh, supra note 23,
at n.149 (citing Restatement (second) of Torts § 431 (1965)).
""See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
1°GWalsh, supra note 23, at 230.
'See Hughes v. Blue Cross of Northern California, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832 (Cal, Ct. App.
1989), in which a California Court of Appeals upheld a trial court award ofTS700,00 in punitive
damages and S150,000 in compensatory damages against the insurance company ba=ed upon a
finding of an incorrect determination of medical necessity during the utilization rewew process.
7McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1993).
1
'See id.; see infra notes 109-201.
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SUBJECT OPINION
McGraw v. PrudentialInsurance Company ofAmerica
The court in McGraw v. PrudentialInsurance Company of America
considered a number of significant issues arising from Linda McGraw's
appeal of three adverse orders in the denial of claims regarding her
medical insurance coverage.' °9 The related holdings can be summarized
as follows. First, ERISA" ° was found to govern the action."' Second, the
insurance carrier's refusal to cover benefits for the patient's physical

McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1253.
"1029 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1998). A comprehensive study of ERISA is well beyond the
scope of this paper. However, a brief description of ERISA will assist in a general understanding
of the materials that follow.
'09See

ERISA is the primary federal law of employee benefits. Congress promulgated
ERISA in response to findings that existing minimum standards for employee
benefit plans were inadequate, plan funds were often insufficient to pay promised
benefits, and plans were often terminated before the accumulation of requisite
funds, thus depriving many employees and their beneficiaries of anticipated
benefits.
L. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can't Get There From Here -- Questioning the Erosion of ERISA
Preemption in MedicalMalpracticeActions Against HMOs, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023, 1037 (1996).
ERISA's primary purpose is to 'protect

. .

. the interests of participants in

employee benefit plans and the beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and
reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information.'
The Act carries out this purpose 'by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts.' Specifically, the statute prescribes minimum standards relating to
participation, funding and vesting. It also sets forth procedural requirements
concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility. Moreover, a plan
participant or beneficiary may enforce ERISA's provisions by bringing an action
to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan, to enforce rights that the plan
grants, or to clarify rights to future benefits.
Id. With ERISA, Congress intended to carve out an area of exclusive federal concern to establish
a system of uniform regulation of employee benefit plans for multi-state employers while
preserving state regulation of tangential areas, so as not to create a regulatory void, nor to infringe
on the states' police powers. To accomplish this, ERISA authors drafted an express preemption
provision that applies generally to all state laws related to employee benefit plans sponsored by
an employer or employee organization. Nicole Weisenbom, ERISA Preemption andIts Effect on
State Health Reform, 5-FALL KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1995).
"l'McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1258.
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therapy was deemed arbitrary and capricious."' Third, exhaustion of the
plan-sponsored dispute remedies would have been futile, and therefore
was unnecessary.' 3 Each of these aspects of the court's decision xll be
discussed.
Linda McGraw's Medical Condition
In 1983, twenty-eight year old Linda McGraw was diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis (MS)." 4 Within seven years of the initial diagnosis,
Linda McGraw began using a walker to assist with movement and relying
on a wheelchair for traveling long distances." 5 In 1991, a neurologist at
the Mayo Clinic performed a comprehensive evaluation of Ms. McGraw
and recommended that she undergo an inpatient evaluation to closely
analyze her mobility problems." 6 Since she was unable to travel back to
the Mayo Clinic, Ms. McGraw was referred to a neurologist closer to her
area.1 7 This physician also confirmed the recommendation for an
inpatient evaluation."' Ms. McGraw subsequently sought the senices of
arehabilitation center forphysical and occupational therapy twice daily." 9
Concurrently, Ms. McGraw underwent treatment for recurrent
urinary tract infections related to the MS. 20 Since self-catheterizations
were impossible due to Ms. McGraw's hand numbness and immobility ,
the treating physician prescribed home nursing visits to perform additional

"'See id. at 1263.
" 3See id. at 1264.
'"See
id. at 1255.

MS is a disease of the central nervous system v,hich occurs in
relapsing/remitting form, "in which exacerbations or relapses, periods of symptom flare-ups. are
interrupted by remissions, times when no new symptoms occur or symptoms improwe? Id at
1254. Symptoms of the disease, including strength loss, coordination and balance dlfficultte:, loss

of bladder control, and numbness, tingling or blurred double vision, are often interrupted by
remissions and times when no new symptoms occur. Id. Accordingly, the course of MS

is

altogether unpredictable. Since the cause of the disorder is as elusive as the diseae taclf, no
preventative treatment or cure is currently known. See id. Myriad treatments for the related
effects of MS are utilized, including drugs that may alter the course ofthe disease. See id at 1255,
Rehabilitation is also an available alternative to promote function and independence by thoZe
suffering from the debilitating symptoms. Id.
..See id. at 1255.
"6See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
"'rsee id.
"'See id.
"9See id.
''See id.
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catheterizations when her husband was at work.12' A nurse
would visit her
22
care.1
health
home
necessary
the
home daily to provide
Due to the seriousness of Ms. McGraw's disease and the
complications posed by her recurrent urinary tract infections, her
physician ordered additional outpatient therapy to improve her strength,
endurance, and mobility. 2 a Seeking an approved referral for this
treatment, the doctor wrote to Ms. McGraw's medical insurance provider,
the Prudential Insurance Company of America. 24 In 1992, the site of the
prescribed physical therapy sessions was moved from an outpatient
facility to Ms. McGraw's home due to her marked mobility limitations. 2 Essentially,26 entering the facility proved too difficult a task for Ms.
McGraw.1
In May of 1993, Ms. McGraw's physician again sought inpatient precertification for care because she lost the ability for self-care and required
intensive physical and occupational therapy that could not occur in the
home. 27 This second inpatient stay was followed by12another
round of
8
home physical therapy and skilled nursing home care.
Prudential's Denial of Payment
Following each of the episodes of inpatient care, Gary McGraw, Ms.
McGraw's husband, submitted claims to his medical insurance totaling
$47,000.129 Prudential Insurance Company denied each claim under the0
policy's general exclusion of services not deemed medically necessary.13
Under the plan provisions, "to avoid the exclusion and receive payment,
the service must be needed or medically necessary.' ' 13' According to the
Prudential Plan, to be medically necessary, a service must satisfy all of the
following qualifications:
(a)

It is ordered by a Doctor.

121See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
"See id.
'2See id.
" 4See id.
'Ssee id.
12
1See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
'"See id.
"8See id.
12'See id.
'3See id.
131McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
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(b) It is recognized throughout the Doctor's profession as safe
and effective, is required for the diagnosis and treatment of
the particular Sickmess or Injury, and is employed
appropriately in a manner and setting consistent Ath
generally accepted United States medical standards; and
(c) It is neither
Educational nor Experimental or Investigational
132
in nature.
To determine whether reimbursement would occur under the
McGraw's Prudential policy, a case manager reviewed the claim and
submitted a recommendation to the medical director. 33 A three-tiered
utilization review process followed. 134 First, a local medical director
decided whether the submitted claim was covered by the insured's
policy.135 Second, any challenge of this decision were to be sent to a
regional medical director. 36 Finally, an Appeals committee consisting of
several members submitting individual ballots confirmed or reversed the
137
regional director's decision.
In Linda McGraw's case, the medical director made the decision to
deny payment of the claim based on the belief that physical therapy was
not an appropriate method to affect the course of MS, therefore was
determined not "medically necessary" under the definitions of the
policy.13 The regional director, a pediatric specialist, concurred in the
decision, as did the appeals committee.'39
Linda McGraw subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming that Prudential
breached its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith under Oklahoma law
by failing to pay for her medical expenses."'O Ms. McGraw initially
alleged that her husband's health insurance qualified as a governmental
plan and was therefore exempt from ERISA. 14' Prudential sought
summary judgment, alleging that ERISA preempted any applicable state
law and therefore barred three of Ms. McGraw's claims because she did
'32See id.
33
See id.
'3See
id.
5

V See id.
"'See
McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
137See id.
138

See id.

39

' See id.

14DSee id.

141See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1256.
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not exhaust plan-sponsored dispute remedies. 142 Furthermore, Prudential
argued for summary judgment on the grounds that the denial of Ms.
McGraw's other two claims were not arbitrary and capricious. 43
District Court Opinion
The district court entered three separate orders in granting summary
judgment in favor of Prudential.' 44 The court first rejected the Plaintiff's
effort to characterize her husband's insurance plan as exempt from45
ERISA, instead finding that the plan was governed strictly by ERISA1
As a result, the court granted summary judgment because Ms. McGraw
failed to exhaust her administrative recourse alternatives for the submitted
claims, as required by ERISA. 146 The court then focused on the denial of
coverage, holding the determination that the treatment was not medically
necessary was not arbitrary and capricious, despite the fact that the
47
decision was made without the review of the patient's medical records.14
Instead, the court found Prudential's decision was made in good faith. 1
The district court held that the decision to deny benefits for physical
therapy followed a reasonable interpretation of the policy in question. 49
The decision to deny reimbursement was based on the reviewing
physician's belief that physical therapy does not affect the course of
MS.' 50 This decision was made even though the physician did not review
Ms. McGraw's medical records, speak with her referring physicians,
examine Ms. McGraw, or consult any medical literature on the subject.''
In the physician's opinion, this was a simple and straightforward decision
based on the nature of the disease.1 52 According to this decision, physical
therapy would only be warranted ifthe patient's overall medical condition
would improve first.' 53 Since there was no evidence that physical therapy
would provide any benefit, and since no evidence indicated a possible

"42
See id. For a discussion of the ERISA preemption process, see supra note 110.
143See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1256.
'See id.
14SSee id.
14See id.
147See id.
'4See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
149See id. at 1259.
'"0See id.
1' See id.
152See id.
'See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
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overall improvement, the treatment prescribed was not deemed medically
necessary. 54 Ms. McGraw subsequently appealed to the Court ofAppeals
for the Tenth Circuit."'
Appellate Court Opinion
Reviewing the district court's decision de novo, the Court of Appeals
examined each issue independently. First, the court focused on whether
or not the insurance policy constituted a governmental plan.' Under
ERISA, "The term 'governmental plan' means a plan established or
maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by
the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any
agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing ... ."157 This section
was described by58the court as focusing on the public entity, which ERISA
deems exempt.
In arguing that her insurance policy was free from ERISA control,
Ms. McGraw attempted to utilize this provision by categorizing her plan
as a governmental entity exempt from ERISA. t59 The court focused on the
degree of control exerted by the Emergency Medical Services Authority
(EMSA), an Oklahoma public trust that exercises control over her
husband's job. 6 According to the court, such a shadowing of an
employee's work with a governmental facade shifts the statutory focus
and blurs the primary issue of whether ERISA governs the action.'
Therefore, the court found that EMSA did not establish the insurance
policy held by the McGraw's and did not directly employ Mr. McGraw. 6"2
Although Mr. McGraw performed tasks assigned to a public agency under
Oklahoma law, the court held that the conditions of his employment were

S4See id.
SSee id. at 1254.
6

See id. at 1257.

'37See id. at 1257; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).
'5'See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1257.
159See id.

"'See id. Ms. McGraw argued that "although herhusband's paycheck comes from Lifeflect,
Inc., a company owned by Secomerica, Inc., a subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, EMSA, in
fact, controls and supervises all of her husband's work, owns all of the equipment connected v, ith
the delivery of ambulance services, purchases all supplies under its tax e'cmpt status, and holds
the license
permitting emergency workers supplied by Lifeflect to operate." Id
61
1 See id.
16

See id.
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more closely related to private sector employment settings.163 The court
16
ultimately held that the health plan was not governmental in nature. 1
Consequently, ERISA preemption of Oklahoma law provided Ms.
McGraw65 with numerous devices through which remedy could be
sought.1
After determining that ERISA governed the action at issue, the court
turned its attention to the denial of benefits under ERISA.166 Following
the guidelines established by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company v. Bruch, 167 the appellate court articulated the position
that a challenge of denial ofbenefits should be "reviewed under a de novo
standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan."' 68 If the benefit plan does offer discretion to the
administrator or fiduciary operating under a conflict of interest, the
conflict must be considered as a determining factor in establishing
'a conflict of interest
whether an abuse of discretion occurred. 69 "Thus,
' 170
triggers a less deferential standard of review."
The plan administered by Prudential expressly gave the insurer
discretion to determine what constitutes medically necessary treatment,
creating a conflict of interest. 1 1 Therefore, the court opted to review the
district court's application of the arbitrary and capricious standard de
novo. 172 However, since every decision regarding benefits made by
Prudential directly impacts the company's finances, the court afforded
these decisions less deference relative to the degree of corresponding

16'See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1258.
'"See
id.
165 See id.

'"See id.

167Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). In this

case, former
employees who were terminated by their employer and subsequently rehired by another
corporation immediately upon sale of employer's plant brought suit for alleged violations of
ERISA. See id. This case was used by the court in McGraw to supply "the standard ofjudicial
review of benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators." McGraw, 137 F.3d at
1258.
"'3McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1258 (citing Firestone,489 U.S. at 115 (1989)).
169See id.
17'Id. (citing Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996);
Pitman v. Blue Cross &Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 123 (10th Cir. 1994); Bedrick v. Travelers Ins,
Co., 93 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1996)).
17'See id. at 1259.
'72Seeid.
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conflict.'73 The court held that "[a] decision to deny benefits is arbitrary
and capricious
if it is not a reasonable interpretation of the plan's
174

terms."
Reviewing the Plaintiffs medical opinions in the matter, the court
found a set of facts that differed drastically from those considered by the
district court which relied on portions of expert testimony. 71 Ms.

McGraw's physicians testified that a distinction exists between what is
treatable and what is curable, pointing out that treatment in the context of

MS concentrates on whatever symptoms exist at the moment.17

Therefore, in the case ofMS, not getting worse was correctly described as

a form of improvement.' 7 The physicians further testified that it would
be extremely difficult to find a physician who would emphatically deny
the use of physical therapy in the course of treatment for MS.'7 3

Following this thought, the court found that sixteen of Ms. McGraw's
almost forty outpatient visits were automatically paid and deemed
medically necessary. 179 As a result, the court found a "significant

improvement" equal to a "measurable and substantial increase in the
patient's physical functional abilities compared to hisfher ability at the
time treatment began."' S'
Upon review, the court noted that Prudential modified its definition
ofmedically necessary to include the additional requirement that treatment
173

See McGrav, 137 F.3d at 1255.
'74Id. at 1259 (citing Semtner v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., 129 F.3d 1390, 1393 (10th
Cir. 1997); Torix v. Ball Corp., 862 F.2d 1428, 1429 (10th Cir. 1988)).
7
76'See id.

1 See id.

1
nSee id. "Thus, maintaining functionality-stretching out the legs to prevent contracturc
which commonly afflict MS patients, coordination exercises, strengthening the uppLr body-t
addressed in the literature submitted in the Appendix and uncontraverted by Prudential, as
essential78 in the treatment for the effects of MS." Id. at 1259-60.
1 See McGrai, 137 F.3d at 1260. "To a question about whether there could be a
reasonable good faith disagreement among doctors about the place of physical therapy in the
treatment of MS, [Dr. Landstrom] answered, 'Well, I suppose there could be, doctori can di a2rce
about just about anything, but I think it would be difficult to find a physician %,
ho %%
ould cay that
physical79therapy has no place in the treatment of multiple sclerosis,"' Id,
1 See id. This information was based on a confidential internal Group Claim Dtviston
Memorandum which the regional medical director referenced vhen making a decision. Sce 1d
This guideline discusses medical necessity as follows. "Physical therapy should be a short-term
intensive and goal-oriented program ordered for a condition having potential for significant
improvement. We consider a 'significant improvement' to be a measurable and substantial
increase in the patient's physical functional abilities compared to his,'her ability at the tim-.
treatment began." Id.
' 'Id. at 1260.
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provide a measurable and substantial increase in functioning and allow for
significant improvement.18 ' However, despite this additional guideline,
the medical director and subsequent reviewers were only charged with
determining whether the treatment met the three criteria listed
previously. 18' Accordingly, Prudential chose to describe the prescribed
treatment as "medically beneficial" but not "medically necessary" since
the treatment was not believed to alter the disease's course. 83 In the
court's view, a thorough reading of the hospital records by the Prudential
representative would have led to a discovery that each physician ordered
physical therapy to assist 8with
Ms. McGraw's condition and to aid her in
4
comfortably.1
more
living
Although Prudential contested the fact that Ms. McGraw left the
hospital on a pass with her husband, the court interpreted this fact as a
positive occurrence."' The court expressed the opinion that there was
nothing in the record mandating that inpatient therapy necessitates twentyfour hour confinement or that periods away from the hospital are
inappropriate. 8 6 Instead, the court applauded such an opportunity and
stated that "one would assume the opportunity for entertainment would be
not only therapeutic, but also desirable in treating the illness."' 87
The court ultimately held that Prudential "made the discretionary
decision to 'give up on' Ms. McGraw."' 88 It found the evidence contained
no indication that the denial of benefits was made following any review
of medical records or a close case analysis.' 89 Additionally, since
Prudential's decision impacted the company's profitability, the court
accorded little deference to the insurer's determination. 9 ' Thus, the court
held that the denial of benefits was both arbitrary and capricious, and
reversed the decision of the district court.191

18'See id.
"'See id.
...McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1255.
184See id.

"'See id. at 1261.
"6 See id. at 1261.
187Id.
"'McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1262.
'"See id.
'"See id. at 1263.
191See id.
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The court finally examined the issue of whether Ms. McGraw
exhausted the administrative remedies available to her.192 ERISA contains
no explicit exhaustion requirement within its boundaries, although
exhaustion of administrative remedies is an implicit requirement when
judicial relief is sought. 93 The court found that the futility exception is
limited to cases where resort to administrative solutions would be useless,
but nonetheless determined that the record clearly established futility in
numerous instances. 94 Foremost, Prudential representatives processed
and reviewed the requests for treatment in an inefficient manner.'9
Delays plagued the process, blurring the distinction between denial of one
claim and the next. 96 Additionally, since the prescribed therapy was
deemed medically necessary by Ms. McGraw's treating physicians,
Prudential utilized its own view of the plan without taking into account
the needs ofthe patient. 197 Finally, the court found that Prudential did not
evaluate Ms. McGraw's claim on an individual basis, but instead
automatically denied each claim arising out of this particular disease."3
The court ultimately held that the district court abused its discretion
in holding that three ofMs. McGraw's claims were not exhausted through
internal review.' 99 These claims were remanded for determination of
whether the denial of payment was arbitrary and capricious under the
guidelines established by this court."O The court further affirmed the
0
district court's decision that ERISA governed the action. '
ANALYSIS
The organization ofmanaged care entities and HMOs/PPOs raises serious
questions about the attempts of such insurance programs to attain costcontainment through money saving techniques in the health care market.
Insurance must be viewed as a business. Insurance companies,

192

See id. at 1263.
'9See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1263.

'94See id. at 1264.
'9SSee id.
'"5See id.
197See id.

'"See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1264.
'9See id.
2
'OSee id.
2
'See id. at 1265.
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specifically HMOs and PPOs, have at their core a need to save money and
earn additional money in order to survive in an increasingly tight and
competitive market. However, insurance companies also have a
responsibility to those customers who pay premiums, expecting quality
care if and when medical treatment is necessary. As a result of the
dichotomy presented between the economic and medical aspects of health
202
insurance, cost-containment measures greatly affect health care systems.
Specifically, cost containment measures can vastly affect the quality of
care that patients receive, a problem that worries many consumers.
"Quality health care requires a high level of health care services that
assist an individual in remaining free from physical and mental incapacity
while maximizing social capacity., 203 In a system which seeks to keep
overhead as low as possible, the primary challenge is to offer quality
assurance measures to protect patient care in the face of counterproductive
economic incentives. 204 High quality care has been defined by the AMA's
Council on Medical Service as that which "consistently contributes to
improvement for maintenance of the quality and/or duration of life. 205 In
an effort to clarify the proposed definition of quality medical care, the
Council on Medical Service has established eight factors believed
necessary for quality care delivery:
(1) the production of optimum improvement in the patient's
physical condition and comfort;
(2) the promotion of prevention and early detection of disease;
(3) the timely discontinuation of unnecessary care;
(4) the cooperation and participation of the patient in the care
process;
(5) the skilled use of necessary professional and technological
resources;
(6) concern for the patient's welfare;
(7) efficient use of resources; and

2

"See Randall, supra note 2, at 32.

23

Id. at 33.

20

4See id.

2

sId. Quality care has also been defined as the "component of the difference between

efficacy and effectiveness that can be attributed to care providers, taking into account the
environment in which they work." Id.
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(8) sufficient documentation of medical records to ensure
continued care and for evaluation of the care by peer
review.0 5

The above stated guidelines appear reasonable from the viewpoint of
a medical care consumer. However, this expectation may not truly
coincide with the reality that consumers experience. In an ideal world, all
of the factors necessary for quality care would be strictly followed, for
none of them appear to be too burdensome to the treating physician or the
health care entity. Financial incentives may provide for a different
perspective, however. Physicians, long concerned about the quality of
care provided to patients, are limited in the era of managed care since the
insurance entity makes the ultimate decisions regarding what treatment
plans will be covered. Therefore, the physician is put in quite a precarious
situation at times, forced to decide between offering the necessary care
knowing that the financial resources will not be provided, or adhering to
the managed care groups' guidelines ofwhat treatments can be prescribed
and in what specific circumstances.
Some may argue that quality care exists within the managed care
world, as individuals are healthier than ever and have more opportunities
to see physicians. Others assert that an overwhelming obsession by
developers of managed care products with cost containment measures
have resulted in the failure to recognize quality assurance in health care.2'
The fact remains that some patients are not receiving necessary care, and
managed care entities appear to be placing financial concerns ahead of
patient care needs."s Courts and legislatures must step in when possible
to offer adequate remedies to the aggrieved.
IMPACT
In an age of big-business organizations and economically based decisions
in the health care field, the McGraw decision is ofthe utmost significance.
This case demonstrates that the courts are willing to take on managed care
authorization decisions that place economic gain and cost-containment

...
See id. (citing AMA Council on Medical Service, Quality of Care, 256 JAMA 1032
(1986)).
""See Randall, supranote 2, at 35.
13See id.
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ahead of patient well-being. Health insurance is designed to provide
individuals with the means necessary to protect themselves, should
something unforeseen threaten their health. From the early days of
insurance policies, insurance provided every class of citizen the means to
receive necessary medical treatment. Patient care was initially the focus
of decision-making, particularly when the insurance companies operated
on a fee-for-service basis, and physicians could not only prescribe
treatment plans without worrying about the costs, but could also reap the
benefits of payment for such procedures. The insurance industry at this
time was not willing to forsake patient care for economic gain, and
individual well-being was accorded the highest degree of importance.
With the advent ofmanaged care and cost containment measures, this
emphasis on patient care gradually diminished in favor of cost cutting and
economic gain. The purpose of health insurance was no longer
necessarily patient well-being, but fiscal integrity of the industry. The
patient then struggles to gain adequate care. Patients constantly were
forced to battle with their managed care provider, watching every decision
made by the agency in reviewing claims in order to ensure that necessary
treatments were provided under the policy. When quality care seemed
jeopardized, individuals began taking matters into their own hands
through difficult battles often involving litigation.
Cases such as McGrawclearly suggest that the well-being ofpatients
must be put before cost-control measures. No longer should arbitrary
utilization review decisions be made under guidelines unknown to the
recipient. Managed care providers need to reevaluate their methods of
utilization review so as to make educated, knowledgeable, and reasonable
decisions regarding the health and welfare oftheir participants. Decisions
must be made in terms of the best interests of the patient and the group,
and not just the entity as a financial enterprise. Automatic denial of
treatments by providers will no longer be tolerated by society or the
courts. It is time for the managed care providers to acknowledge that
individuals with valid and serious ailments need treatment, not insurance
hassles and battles.
This avenue paved by the courts raises a number of questions. Can
utilization review processes ever take the patient's needs into account
before those of cost cutting? Could the managed care system survive
under such guidelines? Will the health care industry accept a system that
focuses not on financial and business concerns but on the well-being of
the patients? What about the consumers? What will the response be of
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those individuals who must deal with the managed care entities ifthe trend
continues and their needs are increasingly subverted to the financial stakes
of the company? Is there anything that consumers can do to alter the
increasingly strong system that currently dominates the health care
industry?
These are but a few of the questions that must be answered in order
to bring any satisfaction to the consumers who currently suffer at the
hands of managed care insurance entities. Although the future of health
care might not be clear, what is clear is that the system must change in
order to fully protect and preserve patient well-being. Only when the
financial and medical aspects of insurance can be reconciled will the
consumers be satisfied and content, and will the insurance providers be
able to successfully achieve ethical cost-containment and financial profit.
Many states and the federal government have attempted to intervene
in this quandary of managed care and patient care. At the federal level,
many versions of a Patients Bill of Rights have been proposed. " State
regulations have also been passed that attempt to regulate managed care
within their jurisdiction.2 1 ' For instance, Oregon has instituted a
comprehensive Patient Protection Act which forces health care plans to
2
disclose the financial incentives offered to physicians to control costs. "
Oregon's plan also offers consumers the right to a full appeals process
212
when denied treatment, as well as allowing access to emergency care.
Texas also has a bill of rights for patients and has made all HMO
complaint records public. 213 Additionally, Texas is the only state that
allows consumers to sue insurance companies if they fail to engage in
"ordinary care" in denying or delaying treatment. 4 These regulations are
a strong starting point to assuring quality patient care, but much more is
necessary to rectify the dichotomy between big business and patient care.

"°SeeKaren Tumulty, Let's Play Doctor,TME, July 13, 1998, at 28, 30.
"'It must be remembered that the state regulations face much difficulty in regulating
anything because of the strong preemptive presence of ERISA in this arena.
"'See Tumulty, supra note 208, at 30.

"2See id.
"3See id.
4
2 See id. at 31.
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CONCLUSION
"In theory, the [health care] marketplace should provide a check on health
plans that cut too far; if your managed-care organization won't deliver the
quality of care you need, you can always switch to one that will. But that
assumes there is competition and free choice. '21 In practice, "most
employers let their workers choose from only a handful ofplans. Industry
consolidation, meanwhile, is reducing competition even further." '16 This
is not the plan envisioned by the initial founders of health maintenance
organizations, whose idea was to have complete health care providers
focusing on prices and quality. 17 The necessary plan of action to improve
the healthcare marketplace must attempt to restore the system to its initial
focus regarding both price and quality care for consumers. Until this
occurs, individuals such as Linda McGraw may unfortunately face
difficult struggles to ensure that they receive the treatments needed and
deserved regardless of cost. Not until this dilemma of finance versus
patient care can be rectified will the health care industry function
accurately, effectively, and efficiently; nor will patients receive the quality
care rightfully owed to them by their health insurance provider.

21

Gorman, supra note 1, at 26.

2
"See id.
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See id. "The form it took, driven by employers, is competition on price alone." Id.

